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Recent commentary on the role of law in international affairs has
frequently degenerated into a debate between legalists and anti-legalists.
The legalists argue that world peace depends upon enlarging the scope
and range of legal rules, the growth of habitual respect for law, and the
creation of international institutions capable of interpreting and en-
forcing the law.' The anti-legalists argue that the expectations of the
legalists are naive and misleading in a world of independent sovereign
states, and that the best prospects for peace depend upon the mainte-
nance of balance between the capabilities and commitments of antago.
nistic countries and ideologies. This balance must be grounded in a
diplomatic equilibrium in which no state has any rational prospect of
achieving significant expansion by conquest. As the world changes, the
legalists, by and large, would alter and reform the legal rules, whereas
the anti-legalists would concentrate upon making political readjust-
ments to preserve the balance.2 After an investigation of the arguments
made by both sides in the debate, this essay will focus on three particu-
lar facets of the general problem posed by the assumed dichotomy
between law and politics: (A) Lawyers as Foreign Policy Planners;
(B) Adherence to Law and the Conduct of Foreign Policy; (C) Law and
the Future of World Order. The discussion attempts to shift the focus
of the present debate to an intermediate position that makes a more
- Milbank Professor of International Law, Princeton University; Fellow. Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences 1968-69; B.S. Econ. 1952, University of
Pennsylvania; LL.B. 1955, Yale Law School; SJ.D. 1962, Harvard Luaw School.
1. Judith Shklar, in her excellent book on the subject, defines legalism as "the ethical
attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships
to consist of duties and rights determined by rules." J. SnRLAR, LwE.ALM: A,, EsmSy oX
L4.w, Monmss, PoLrrmcs 1 (1964).
2. The conflicting positions of the legalists and antilegalists have recently been -et
forth -with darity and insight by Louis Henkin. L. HF-Nl How NATIONS BFILvE: LAW
AND FOREIGN PoucY 245-71 (1968).
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precise and realistic estimate of the contributions, limitations, and
potentialities of law and lawyers to the foreign policy-making process of
the United States.
The polarity of the opposing positions was clearly visible at the 1963
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law. On
that occasion Dean Acheson dismissed the importance of law in matters
of high sovereign concern in as unqualified a manner as we have heard
in recent years from a person of high stature. Mr. Acheson told the large
assembly of international lawyers, no doubt attracted partly by the
lustre of his presence, that international law is of no significance in the
resolution of important issues of foreign policy. His words were charac-
teristically astringent:
I must conclude that the propriety of the Cuban quarantine is not
a legal issue. The power, position, and prestige of the United States
had been challenged by another state; and law simply does not
deal with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes
close to the sources of sovereignty.
3
Mr. Acheson's remarks were highly provocative. He shared the platform
with Abram Chayes, then Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State, who
appeared to be proud of the role that law had played in moderat-
ing and shaping the execution of the decision to interdict the place-
ment of Soviet missiles on Cuban territory.
4 But what is more, Mr.
Acheson was himself an eminent international lawyer, who had re-
turned to the practice of law after leaving the government in 1952.
Perhaps the immediate adverse reaction to his comments was magnified
by a subconscious feeling among the members of the audience that
they had borne witness to a betrayal of their vocation. To justify their
feeling it is not difficult to show that many governmental decisions on
matters of war and peace are shaped in beneficial ways by a sophisti-
cated handling of international law.5 Moreover, there are many practi-
cal drawbacks to a position that encourages all governments to insist
on the legitimacy of sovereign prerogative on occasions of their own
choosing.
But, perhaps the anti-legalist position was disputed too mechanically
and without sufficient consideration of the way in which legal argu-
ments can be and have been used. In the 1960's a series of controversial
3. Acheson, Remarks, Proceedings American Society of International Law 13, 14 (1963).
4. See Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREGN Ari. 550 (1963); Chayes,
The Legal Case for U.S. Action on Cuba, 47 DEP'T. STATE BULL. 763 (1962). See also
Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law, 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 515 (1963).
5. See HENKIN, supra note 2.
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American foreign policy undertakings drew heavily upon legal rhetoric
and argumentation to defend their validity, especially in reaction
against domestic critics in the United States. We find, for instance, the
Legal Adviser to the State Department, Mr. Leonard D. Meeker, going
to considerable lengths to demonstrate a legal basis for the American
military occupation of the Dominican Republic in April of 1965. Mr.
Meeker suggested that his approach to international law "would prop-
erly be described as practical idealism." In his thinking "fundamentalist
views on the nature of international legal obligations are not very use-
ful as a means to achieving practical and just solutions of difficult
political, economic, and social problems." Mr. Meeker went on to
say that
[i]t does not seem to me that law and other human institutions
should be treated as abstract imperatives which must be followed
for the sake of obeisance to some supernatural power or for the
sake of some supposed symmetry that is enjoined upon the human
race by external forces. Rather, it seems to me that law and other
institutions of society should be seen as deliberate and hopefully
rational efforts to order the lives of human communities-from
small to great-in such a way as to permit realization by all mem-
bers of a community of the full range of whatever creative powers
they may possess."
The cosmic vision expressed by these sentiments is widely shared, but
arouses suspicion when used to validate what appeared to most im-
partial observers as a blatant violation of one of the basic norms of
modern international law: the prohibition of unilateral recourse to
force except in a situation of self-defense. However one might interpret
the Dominican turbulence at the time of the American military in-
volvement, it was not a situation in which the United States could
purport to be acting in collective self-defense to protect the Dominican
Republic against external attack.7 Rather, the intervention in Domin-
ican affairs bears an obvious, if odious, resemblance to the Soviet in-
tervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968. The strength of the
comparison is heightened by the reliance of both principal govern-
ments upon a regional or collective endorsement to veil the unilateral
nature of their use of military power to interfere with the domestic
6. Mfeeker, The Dominican Situation on the Perspective of International Law, 53
DEP'T. STATE BuLL. 60 (1965).
7. This interpretation that the United States did not act in self-defense is strongly
supported even in a conservative account of the Dominican intervention. See J. MArm'r.
OvMTAXEN By" EvamiS (1966).
921
The Yale Law Journal
politics of a foreign country." Certainly the Soviet claim to maintain
the integrity of governments in the socialist community has a hollow-
ness comparable to the State Department's "practical idealism" when
it is used to justify suppressing Czech domestic developments that
appear to be merely antithetical to Soviet interests.
This excursion into the dark domains of interventionalist diplomacy
adds a dimension to the debate between the legalists and the
anti-legalists. The anti-legalists are entitled to complain when a gov-
ernment dresses rationalizations of policy in legal language. In such
circumstances, law is less a fig leaf than a see-through garment. Conse-
quently, there is a strong impulse to strip away the legalistic pretension;
better see policy as naked power than disguise the choice by enshroud-
ing it in a gauzy film of legalism. Such a call for directness, perhaps
an element of Mr. Acheson's remarks, is evident in some more recent
comments on the role of law and lawyers in the making of foreign
policy.
Mr. Henry Kissinger, the now influential Assistant to President Nixon
on National Security Affairs, has often inveighed against what he regards
as the detrimental effects of legalism on the formulation of American
foreign policy. In his widely studied article on settling the Vietnam
war, Kissinger argued that these legalistic tendencies of the Govern-
ment inhibited the commencement of negotiations with the North
Vietnamese. He suggested that ours is "a government which equates
commitments with legally enforceable obligations," and that our pre-
occupation with this equation prevented us from even discerning sig-
nals sent by North Vietnam's government indicating its willingness to
take satisfactory action in exchange for a bombing halt provided that
its action did not have to be based on a formal commitment. Kissinger
also contended that "the legalistic phrasing" of Washington's demands
"obscured their real merit," in effect arguing that the language of law
was inappropriate to the setting and had an undesirable impact upon
diplomacy. The repetition of this point several times in Mr. Kissin-
ger's article makes it clear how strongly he feels that talking like a
lawyer may keep the policy-maker from perceiving and resolving "the
real issues."
This point of view becomes even more pronounced in a general
8. Cf. the principal Soviet legal argument (the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine) for
occupying Czechoslovakia as formulated in an article translated from Pravda and published
under the title Sovereignty and International Duties of Socialist Countries. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 27, 1968, at 27, col. 1.
9. Kissinger, The Viet Nam Negotiations, 47 FORIGN AFF. 211, 222.23 (1969).
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essay that Kissinger wrote on foreign policy just before he took office. 10
In this essay Kissinger contended that "we have historically shied
away" from an inquiry "into the essence of our national interest and
into the premises of our foreign policy" because of an insistence on
casting our political interests in the form of legal responsibilities: "It
is part of American folklore that, while other nations have interests,
we have responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with equi-
librium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of peace."'" The
rejection of law by Mr. Kissinger was particularly significant because
he reoriented his entire analysis of foreign policy in the direction of
world order: "The greatest need of the contemporary international
system is an agreed concept of order."' 2 And at the close of his essay he
implied that unless we "ask the right questions"-that is, those that
bear on interests--"we will never be able to contribute to building a
stable and creative world order ... ." It seems fair to suggest that Mr.
Kissinger regards law and legal rhetoric as an encumbrance rather than
as a resource in the construction of a stronger system of world order.
Presumably in the background of this analysis lies John Foster
Dulles's frantic search for treaties of alliance in the 1950's, as if a
treaty, however fragile its political basis, could give assurance of the
ability and willingness of governments around the world to contain
Communism. In the foreground, of course, lies the defense of the
United States involvement in the Vietnam war by an appeal to treaty
commitments and by a claim that a world legal order is thereby sus-
tained.'4 The pseudo-legalist ideology of Dean Rusk and Walt Rostow
is the work of non-lawyers, who have frequently been more guilty than
10. Kissinger, Central Issues of American Foreign Policy, in AcNDA toit Tit Nrtor;




14. Even Mr. Kissinger, despite his concern for the formalism and legalism of American
foreign policy, writes as follows about "commitments" in the context of the Victnam wmr:
Much of the bitter debate in the United States about the war has been conducted in
terms of 1961 and 1962. Unquestionably, the failure at that time to analyze adequately
the geopolitical importance of Viet Nam contributed to the current dilemma. But
the commitment of 500,000 Americans has settlcd the issue of the importance of
Viet Nam. For what is involved now is confidence in American promises. However
fashionable it is to ridicule the terms "credibility" or "prestige," they are not empty
phrases; other nations can gear their actions to ours only if they can count on our
steadiness. The collapse of the American effort in Viet Nam would not mollify many
critics; most of them would simply add the charge of unreliability to the accusation
of bad judgment. Those whose safety or national goals depend on American commit-
ments could only be dismayed. In many parts of the world-the Middle East, Europe,
Latin America, even Japan-stability depends on confidence in American promises.
Kissinger, supra note 9, at 218-19. Mr. Kissinger uses commitment in two different senses
and is somewhat vague about the causal link between American "commitments" and
specific behavior.
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lawyers of rigid application of legal rules and the rhetorical use of the
language of the law. In fact, Dean Acheson is just one of many at-
torneys who have served in the State Department; such lawyers tend
to be exemplary exponents of the pragmatic traditions of the common
law and are themselves anti-legalist in their philosophy. What is dis-
turbing about the simpler statements of the anti-legalist position is its
double confusion: first, an inaccurate and simplistic presentation of the
legal tradition and, second, a false depiction of the relationship be-
tween "a characteristic legalism"'I5 and certain recent extravagances in
American foreign policy.
The comments of Mr. Kissinger, among others, suggest how impor-
tant it is to enter the debate between legalists and anti-legalists and to
examine some particular aspects of the controversy in order to
achieve a more realistic and constructive analysis of the proper role
for lawyers in foreign policy-making on behalf of the United States
Government.'
A. Lawyers as Foreign Policy Planners
Henry Kissinger characterizes "the sort of analysis at which [Ameri-
cans] excel" in the conduct of foreign relations as "the pragmatic, legal
dissection of individual cases." 17 The same point is made more nega-
tively by Zbigniew Brzezinski, the foreign policy specialist and former
government adviser, who writes:
Coming from a society traditionally suspicious of conceptual
thought (where a "problem-solving" approach is held in es-
teem and concepts are denigrated as "intellectual cubbyholes"),
shaped by a legal and pragmatic tradition that stresses the case
method and the importance of precedents, the understandable
15. Law functions within a structure of shared assumptions; its starting point Is
the acceptance, by all parties, of the legitimacy of the legal structure and of the
values it embodies.
Everyone understands that this shared value commitment and belief in the adjudica-
tion of conflict does not exist in more than a fragmentary manner in international
society. Nevertheless, the legal habit of mind has sometimes led the United States to
discount these difficulties, even to assume for itself and its own policies an interna-
tional legitimacy which other states were unwilling to concede. Along with this has
gone a trust in formal arrangements and alliances which the social and political
realities have not at all times justified.
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1969, at 46, col. 1 (editorial). The intellectual underpinnings of this
analysis are explicitly attributed to the celebrated critiques of American foreign policy
made more than a decade ago by Kennan and Morgenthau. G. KENNAN, REALITIEs OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1954); G. KENNAN, AMERCAN DIPLOMIACY, 1900-1950 (1952);
H. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (4th ed. 1967); H. MORGENThAU, IN DEFENSE OF
NATIONAL INTEREST (1951).
16. For fuller development along these lines, see R. FALK, Tim STATUS OF LAw IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1969).
17. Kissinger, supra note 9, at 221.
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conditioned reflex of the policy-maker is to universalize from the
success of specific policies, formulated and applied in the "pre-
global" age of American foreign policy.' 8
Kissinger and Brzezinski are associating the case method, which is the
main emphasis of the lawyer's professional training, with an inductive
and pragmatic approach to foreign policy. And Brzezinski also empha-
sizes this approach as the distinctive character of the common law as a
legal system. Both authors find this strain expressed in the dominant
philosophical traditions of the United States, themselves continuations
and outgrowths of British empiricism that emphasize problem-solving
and pragmatic criteria of judgment. This kind of inductive orientation
toward governmental policy-making contrasts with the more conceptual,
deductive traditions associated with Continental jurisprudence and
philosophy.19 Each tradition has its distinctive strengths and weak-
nesses, biases and predispositions that have distinct impacts, depending
on a country's particular historical setting.
What is important to appreciate, however, is that a particular legal
style is derived from a wider tradition of thought prevailing within a
particular society; it is a product of many influences and not attribut-
able in any very illuminating way to a particular experience of voca-
tional training in the law. Thus it is not surprising that ideological
predispositions might take precedence over the problem-solving men-
tality for lawyers (e.g., John Foster Dulles) and non-lawyers (e.g., Dean
Rusk, Walt Rostow) in the service of government. And whatever it is
that is properly associated with the pragmatic approach of the common
law is not at all identical with the legalistic patterns of justification in-
voked by some lawyers in the course of carrying out their governmental
functions.
A parallel tradition of piety and self-sacrifice has its roots in the
religious origins of the United States and can be seen clearly in the
Puritan heritage. This religiosity seeks to disguise self-interested mo-
18. Brzezinski, Purpose and Planning in Foreign Policy, TnE PtMtnC INrT anrS, Winter
1969, at 52, 54-55. Kissinger also argues for a better conceptual framework for foreign
policy in the essay cited in note 10, supra.
19. Brzezinski's statement about the legal tradition contains an odd mixture of miscon-
ceptions. The case method is a technique of anal)sis and pedagogy rather than a widely
accepted system of adjudication. (Arbitration would be doser to the ad hoc "problem-
solving" that Brzezinski first refers to.) The very importance of precedent is a demonstra-
tion that each case is not seen as a discrete problem in the American legal system.
Universalizing from the numerous cases which form a line of precedent will quickly bring
the thoughtful student of the law to the intellectual cubbyholes of conceptual thought.
The difference from Continental systems lies in how we reach that plane of conceptual
discussion rather than in taking the extreme nominalist position that generalized concepts
have no value at all. The Restatement is the end rather than the beginning.
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tives, aspires to act for the common good, and is interested in setting
a moral example of unselfish sacrifice for the other governments of
the world that, according to this outlook, follow a much more self-
centered course of action in foreign affairs.20 The ideas underlying the
doctrine of the separation of church and state, together with the pro-
gressive secularization of American society, have stimulated a search
for non-religious modes of expression by those entrusted with the task
of making and justifying American foreign policy. Law and lawyers
have often fulfilled this social need, providing a kind of idealistic
discourse that represents partly a genuine reformist tradition and
partly a hypocritical disguise for acquisitive behavior. Calvinism has
20. Those who support the role of the United States in the Vietnam War often
emphasize the absence of any selfish American interests in Vietnam. We want no
territory or foreign bases, and we have no economic holdings or ambitions. Although the
denial of any selfish interest may not be altogether convincing, its frequent repetition by
high officials is a powerful illustration of the point made in the text. The United State%
substitutes the rightness of its cause for the selfish pursuit of interests, and feels no
compunctions about unleashing its destructive might upon a poor and rather backward
Asian country. When interests are pursued then costs tend to be assessed and the enter.
prise confined by some concept o net worth. But when supposedly selfless principles
underlie the commitment then no assessment can be made, and no cost is too high. The
American effort to end the Vietnam war indicates that some sense of "worth" finally took
precedence over the moralistic insistence that the United States was acting to show that
aggression doesn't pay, or that collective self-defense works, or that we are a government
that upholds its commitments; since no moral contention was very convincing there was
a tendency to shift from one to another in a desperate struggle to plug the dike erected
against the mounting tide of domestic and international opposition to the war. But up
until President Johnson's speech of March 31, 1968, no government official moved the
debate about the war off the terrain of selfless promotion of moral and legal principles
the value of which could not be weighed against the adverse effects of its continuation.
Within the American elite it has been the pragmatic counter-tradition that has broken
with the moralism and legalism of the Rusk-Rostow position. The formulations of Arthur
Schlesinger, McGeorge Bundy, and Henry Kissinger are characteristic of this pragmatic
(opportunistic?) reevaluation of American policy in Vietnam. Bundy's Address at Del'auw
University in October 12, 1968, is one of the best examples of this break with morallsm.
Mr. Bundy says:
Until the present burden of Vietnam is at least partly lifted from our society, It will
not be easy-it may not even be possible-to move forward effectively with other
great national tasks. This has not always been my view, but ... it seems to me wholly
clear now that at its current level of effort and cost the war cannot be allowed to
continue for long. Its penalities upon us all are much too great. (Mimeographed
text, p. 2)
Lest he be understood as a sudden convert to matters of principle, Mr. Bundy makes plain
that his change of position on Vietnam was a matter of pure expediency:
I remind you also, if you stand on the other side, that my argument against escalation
and against an indefinite continuation of our present course has been based not on
moral outrage or political hostility to the objective, but rather on the simple and
practical ground that escalation will not work and that continuation of our present
course is unacceptable.
Mr. Schlesinger expresses the same theme when he writes: "The tragedy of Vietnam Is the
tragedy of the catastrophic overextension and misapplication of valid principles. The
original insights of collective security and liberal evangelism were generous and wise."
°
Vietnam and the End of the Age of Superpowers, HARPERS, March 1966, at 41-49. My
overriding contention, one that will be developed in later stages of the article, is that
neither moralism-legalism of the Rusk-Rostow variety nor expediency of the Bundy-
Schlesinger variety provide America with an adequate basis for policy and choice In world
aflairs.
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contributed the zealously held notions of personal salvation and a
vigilant, omnipotent god, and this combination has led to a confusion
between what is beneficial for oneself and for the general welfare.
Socially this confusion is compounded by the suggestively similar ideas
of laissez faire, the "invisible hand" of Adam Smith, and Social
Darwinism that are all embodied in American intellectual traditions.
The world views of Woodrow Wilson after World War I exemplified
these confusions-the idealistic gropings for the grand design con-
joined to a search for American leadership and preeminence in world
affairs.
In conclusion, then, the inductive particularism of the common
law is neither confined to law, nor is it espoused by all American
lawyers. The "case" approach reflects a broader kind of philosophi-
cal tradition associated with British empiricism and the whole struggle
against Thomistic and Cartesian modes of thought and organization
evolved out of Catholic dogma and Continental traditions of specula-
tion.21 Similarly, the legalism that is found in American diplomacy
often represents displaced religious and moral sentiments that derive
from the whole spiritual foundation of the Republic in colonial times.
Legalism in formulation and approach is a way of maintaining the
pristine integrity of a moral system in a pluralistic society; the emphatic
piety remains resonant even when the rhetorical appeal has been
shifted to more secular grounds. It seems no accident that Woodrow
Wilson and John Foster Dulles, our two most eminent legalists, were
both men of deep, central, religious conviction who devoted themselves
to careers in the vortex of secularism. It seems that the espousal of
legalism has little, if anything, directly to do with membership in the
legal profession. Law may be a foil for suppressed religious concerns;
equally lawyers may be problem-solvers with neither the virtues nor
the vices of statesmen of more grandiose visions who would build a
new world order for our time.
B. Adherence to Law and the Conduct of Foreign Policy
The value of a law-oriented foreign policy is obscured by the char-
acter of the legalist-anti-legalist debate. The acceptance of a framework
for legal restraint in the external relations of the country seems at least
as much related to the promotion of national welfare as does adherence
to law in domestic affairs. A discretionary basis for foreign policy in
21. Such particularism is also associated with the importance of "town meetings" in
early America and the rise of a congregationalist tradition in ecclesiastical affairs.
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the nuclear age seems to increase the risks of self-destructive warfare.
The scale of violence is now so large that it becomes less and less tenable
to entrust decisions affecting the interests and welfare of the world
community to the particular appraisals of policy made by small num-
bers of executive officials at the national level.22 The problems of the
world-peace, welfare, dignity-increasingly presuppose some form of
supranational control to protect the general interest. The prospects
for building governmental structures at the world level remain poor,
and so in the interest of preventing disastrous breakdowns, the restric-
tion of national freedom of choice could function as one formidable
source of restraint upon the ruinous tendencies of our present inter-
national society. The norms of international law, impartially inter-
preted and applied, are a forceful source of restraint upon the self-
seeking proclivities of sovereign states. The real difficulty with Mr.
Acheson's views about the conduct of diplomacy in a situation of
crisis is a prudential one, namely, that to affirm the discretionary basis
of foreign policy in the nuclear age is to invite eventual disaster, even
if, or perhaps especially if, the effective discretion to act is vested only
in the governments of the major powers.
Mr. Kissinger contends that our dedication to "principle" makes it
hard for us to articulate a truly vital interest which we would defend
against a challenge we thought was "legal.1 23 We deny that force is
being used by the United States to uphold or enhance America's power
and prestige, much less its wealth. American policy-makers normally
rely upon a selfless explanation for action taken abroad. Thus we tend
to justify our foreign policy decisions by turning to principles of uni-
versal appeal, such as the need to resist "aggression." According to
Kissinger, these patterns of generalized justification lead to an in-
definite multiplication of commitments. He counsels, instead, a hard-
headed appraisal of vital interests as a strategy for bringing our
"ecommitments" into better correlation with our "interests" and "cap-
abilities." In such a reorientation it may be necessary to undertake
some "illegal" courses of action and to refrain from joining many
"legal" causes.
Why is international law a better source of national self-restraint
than the kind of interest calculus that Mr. Kissinger proposes? Clearly
22. Garrett Hardin makes this argument in vivid and generic terms through an In-
terpretation of the experience with over-grazing of community commons. Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SciENcE 1243 (1968).
23. Kissinger, supra note 10, at 611.
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law has little to offer as a basis for guidance and restraint if it is
manipulated in a self-serving and post-facto fashion or becomes as-
similated into the tradition of formulating pious self-avowals in legal
rhetoric. 24 At the same time, international law provides the potential
basis for guiding the action of all governments within an agreed frame-
work. It has relatively stable principles that are not easily altered by
shifts in governmental conception of the national interest or by mis-
calculations as to the intermeshing of definitions of national interests
by adversary governments. Kissinger's views seem overly dependent on
the wisdom and prudence of the particular group in control of a
government.
Self-determination of rights and duties-a self-help system-is se-
verely biased by self-serving interpretations of what is reasonable, in-
terpretations which are marked by hostility, distrust, self-seeking,
and wide cultural diversity. In this situation the position and traditions
of the United States make its adherence to international law particularly
important. The great power of the United States relative to every
other country, including the Soviet Union, make its acceptance of
restraint particularly significant. Secondly, there is little incentive or
likelihood that other principal states could take advantage of American
adherence to international law. Technological developments much
more than territorial expansion are the key to changes in relative power
in the present world. As a result, the legal order presents neither
obstacles nor temptations to the potential expansionist state. Thirdly,
the rules and expectations embodied in international law are suffi-
ciently permissive to allow a government to take whatever action is
needed to uphold its territorial integrity and political independence.
Fourthly, the United States needs to set certain examples of self-limi-
tation in the interest of inducing reciprocal restraints by other states.
Such reciprocity seems an essential part of any program designed to
cope with the spread of weapons of mass destruction to more and more
countries in the years ahead. Fifthly, there is a genuine American
24. The following passage is a striking illustration of this tradition:
In the period of primarily American responsibility for peace since 1945, we have
used our force prudently, cautiously, and for limited and defensive ends. We have
used force in conformity with international law, in order to enforce it. When we had
a monopoly of nuclear weapons, we did not seek to impose our will on the rest of
the world. Nor have we even overthrown the regime of Castro in Cuba.
E. Rosrow, LAw, PowER, AND THE Puasurr OF PEACE 11 (1968).
'i.r. Rostow seems to be confusing adherence to law with certain decisions to refrain
from using all the power at the disposal of a national government. But surely some lesser
uses of power may not be compatible with the sovereign status of other countries, nor with
the legal prohibitions on non-defensive uses of national force against foreign countries.
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tradition of respect for law and concern for justice that could play a
part in seeking to strengthen the quality of world order. For all these
reasons it is important to bring impartial legal perspectives to bear
early in the formation of policy.
As in domestic law it is possible, and necessary to distinguish be-
tween an ex parte manipulation of law and its impartial and auton-
omous application. The present bureaucratic structure is ill-suited to
serve the latter objective. The Legal Adviser is a subordinate officer
of the Secretary of State. His role is often couched in terms that require
him to be an adversary litigator with the Government as his "client."
While his advice on legal matters may be enlightened, and he may try
to avoid violence, he still is a subordinate State Department official
essentially advocating an adversary position in the Government. This
status and arrangement seem too haphazard, except in relation to the
routine affairs of international life that are rarely considered by the
political officers of government.
The President needs to receive legal advice at the Cabinet level from
an Attorney General for International Affairs. The conception of offi-
cial duty for this proposed post should stress the obligations of impartial-
ity, the search for objective criteria of guidance, and the importance of
participating at all stages of the formation and application of foreign
policy. Such an Attorney General should be assisted by official panels
of experts on various dimensions of international life who have access
to all governmental information and are obliged to deliver expert
opinions. The Attorney General for International Affairs should be
regarded as a non-political appointee, subject to removal from office
only for cause. He should sit as an ex officio member of the National
Security Council and command a budget sufficient to enable careful,
rapid staff work on all legal questions.
C. Law and the Future of World Order
Images of world order may be developed from both legal and non-
legal traditions of thought about international affairs. Unfortunately,
the images drawn from traditions of legal thought have tended to be
models of domestic legal systems generalized to apply to the whole of
international society. These models are static, tend to ignore the
enormous difficulties of moving from the present decentralized struc-
ture of international society to a highly centralized structure, and
appear artificial and unrealistic if offered as either a prediction of or
a prescription for the future.
On the other hand, the images of world order deriving from non-
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legal traditions of thought tend to be models of interaction that are
only marginally different from the existing structure of power and
behavior in international society. Mr. Kissinger's notions about world
order appear to be little more than an updating of Metternich's ideas
for securing a stable and dynamic equilibrium in international society.
The chief buttresses of the non-legal model are alliances, an assessment
of the correlation between capabilities and commitments, and a hier-
archial ordering of interests vital to the country. The achievement of
such world order depends upon an acceptance of the international
status quo for an indefinite period, or at least a perceived unwillingness
on the part of all major governments to secure major gains through
force of arms. The difficulty with this diplomatist image of world order
is that it seems to accept decentralized procedures as adequate for the
maintenance of minimum order and welfare in international society.
There is presently an intellectual vacuum that needs to be filled
with more adequate images of world order, responsive to the history
and traditions of a world of sovereign states and to the emerging
functional problems that cannot be handled, in many cases, by the
national governments of even the most powerful states. The control
of oceanic and atmospheric pollution, the regulation of weather
modification and other uses of space, the beneficial use of data collection
relevant to many phases of human existence, the regulation of the
multi-national corporation, problems of resource conservation and
exploration, and the moderation of the effects of shifts in the supply
of and demand for food suggest the urgency of evolving functional
bodies that have a transnational center of authority and control. The
maintenance of world order may depend on the design and acceptance
of a scheme of overlapping, interlocking, and organizationally disparate
functional institutions that ignore the confines of national boundaries
and elude the control of national governments. Such a network may
come to play an increasingly vital role as problems of armed violence
across boundaries are subordinated to the differential opportunities
for and hazards of various strategies of technological exploitation. The
deployment of fast-breeder nuclear reactors, capable of converting
arid land into an agro-industrial complex may become more signifi-
cant than the deployment of missles with nuclear warheads. Failures
to take adequate precautions to prevent damage from radioactive
waste may pose greater problems than the danger of war and surprise
attack. The proposals for order and control should be responsive to
the problems emerging from the international environment.
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Moderate population projections predict a world population by the
first decade of the twenty-first century that will be almost double what
it is today.25 These increases will be concentrated in the poorer parts
of the world which have no prospect of adequately feeding or caring for
their populations. The problem is not only preventing famine, but
also securing health, education, housing, and a life of some opportunity
for most people in the world.26 Population expansion vastly increases
the difficulty of making reasonable progress along all these other lines,
and also causes more than proportionate increases in garbage, pollution,
and resource depletion. Increasing population densities also raise the
propensity of social groups toward disease, riot, distress, and desperate
politics. In such environments, strategies of internal and external
change that rely on violence are much more likely.
Thus, like the Polish army of the thirties, supposedly buttressed by
the working of the balance of power and by impressive treaty systems,
we are a knight errant facing the future in gallant ignorance, equipped
with ideas whose time has passed. Non-legal approaches to world order
characteristically ignore the international dimension of the problems
of pollution, population, and poverty. Legal approaches to world order
equally ignore the problems of adapting to the new technological en-
vironment. Only in relation to nuclear war is the case for drastic change
in our attitude toward world order sufficiently understood.
There are several suggestions that follow from this discussion: (1)
the outline of a new kind of transnational functionalist world order
should be put in explicit and coherent form; (2) international lawyers
should begin to define ecological, demographic, and technological de-
velopments as within the province of their professional concern; (3)
the idea of a world order emphasizing the problems of war and peace
should be rejected in favor of a broader conception that is equally
concerned with the protection and promotion of dignity, safety, and
security for individuals and groups. Power and the mechanisms for
restraining its use are no longer adequate foci of concern in our ever-
more interdependent and overcrowded world of shared danger and
opportunity.
25. Projections of population growth and their conservative interpretation are to be
found in Notestein, Population Growth and Its Control, in OvErco,1UNO WoluD HUNout
9, 16-17 (C. Hardin ed. 1969).
26. For some discussion of projected population growth and its global consequences,
see P. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968); G. MYRDAL, THE ASIAN DRAMA (3 vols.
1968); W. PADDOCK & P. PADDOCK, FANIINE-19751 (1967).
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Conclusion
The purpose of this article is to redefine the debate on legalism in
terms that are more responsive to the international needs of the day. -
Such an endeavor requires some clarification of what is truly character-
istic and distinctive about the legal tradition, especially as it presents
itself in our national setting. Only on this basis is it possible to assess
the claims advanced for and against law in relation to the conduct of
foreign policy. Above all, it is essential to distinguish between the
intellectual traditions of an American lawyer and the ideological
orientations of American statesmen, who may or may not be law yers
but who use legal rhetoric to express moral preferences which often
spring from other and wider sources.
The rejection of legalism does not make the case for anti-legalism.
The argument for a common framework of restraint that has some
objective standing independent of the judgment of government of-
ficials seems overwhelmingly persuasive in the nuclear age when the
margin of fatal miscalculation is so small and the prospect of mutually
contradictory selection of facts and claims is so great. The search for
objectivity in such an atmosphere deserves priority, and the techniques
and vocation of the lawyer are admirably suited for the task, especially
if the search is removed from governmental pressures by giving national
legal advisers greater independence than they now enjoy. In the Ameri-
can context serious consideration should be given to the creation of a
Cabinet post of Attorney General for International Affairs. Such efforts
at the national level should be accompanied by parallel and comple-
mentary efforts to create procedures for the settling of disputes on
the international level, whether within specialized agencies, regional
or global institutions.
Both the traditional legalist and anti-legalist notions of world order
have been slow to adapt to a new set of international concerns that are
becoming problems of the first magnitude. We must work for a system
of world order which will not only diminish the probability of large-
scale and sustained violence, but will also meet the threats that arise
from over-population, pollution, technological innovation, and resource
depletion. We need, in other words, a redefinition of the task of
27. My argument should not be read to imply that international laivyers are b" and
large either legalists or anti-legalists. On the contrary, the academic mainstream of con-
temporary international legal studies exhibits my search for an intermediate statement
of the link between law and politics. The legalist/anti-legalist discussion enjo)s promi-
nence mainly in discussions of the proper framework of restraint for the conduct of US.
foreign policy.
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global planning. That work should include a new, common effort by
both legalists and non-legalists. No single disciplinary perspective is
adequate in either its analysis of the problems of world order or the
design of strategies for their solution. The argument for inter-disci-
plinary collaboration is both convincing and urgent, as is the case for
forging a new synthetic concern for world order that engages specialists
in many areas, including law, political science, economics, sociology,
ecology, systems design, and the computer sciences.
The primary task is to keep the existing system under some degree
of reasonable control during a period of transition to some more cen-
tralized system. The task is urgent. Cumulative and symbiotic develop-
ments in population growth, resource supply, pollution of oceans and
space, and the technology of destruction suggest that only a few decades,
at most, remain before the risks and costs of maintaining the existing
system of world order will become unendurable.
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